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Abstract 
This study examines the issue of debt distress of rural labour households (agricultural 
and non-agricultural labour), in all the major Indian states, using data from the 61st 
round, pertaining to 2004-05, of the National Sample Survey (NSS).  We conduct this 
study at various levels and using different methodological approaches. First, using a 
definition of “debt distress”, set out in detail in the following section, we calculate the 
value of debt distress for every rural labour household (RLH) in the NSS. Then we 
aggregate these households to rank states, districts, and social groups according to the 
degree of their distress.  Second, using the tools of inequality analysis, we compute 
the degree of inequality in the distribution of distress among indebted RLH and ask 
how much of this inequality can be explained by the fact households (a) live in 
different states and (b) belong to different social groups?  Third, using the tools of 
regression analysis, we examine the strength of the factors impinging on whether a 
household is a debtor household and, if it is, the strength of the factors determining 
whether it obtained loans from institutional sources or from money lenders and 
whether it took a loan for “productive” or “non-productive” purposes. 
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1. Introduction 
 One of the less known aspects of India’s growth performance is that while 
overall GDP has grown at impressive rates (averaging 6.3% per annum over the 
period 1988-2006) much of this growth has been generated by the manufacturing and 
services sector (averaging, respectively, 6.8% and 7.8% per annum over 1988-2006) 
and that growth in agriculture, at an average of 3.4% per annum over 1988-2006, has 
been woefully inadequate to raise the living standards of the nearly 60% of India’s 
population who depend on it for their living.1  Indeed, a major area of concern in 
India’s political economy is the “distress” of farmers saddled with large and, often, 
crippling debts which in many cases have led to farmers committing suicide (Suri, 
2006).   
 However, much of the study of the distress of farmers has been conducted at 
the level of specific Indian states and, in particular, for those states in which there has 
been a rash of distress-induced suicides: for example, Satish (2006) has examined 
farmers’ suicides for Punjab; Mishra (2006) for Maharashtra; Sridhar (2006) for 
Andhra Pradesh; Deshpande (2006) for Karnataka; and Mohankumar and Sharma 
(2006) for Kerala. This study, by contrast, examines the issue of debt distress of rural 
labour households (agricultural and non-agricultural labour), in all the major Indian 
states, using data from the 61st round, pertaining to 2004-05, of the National Sample 
Survey (NSS).  We conduct this study at various levels and using different 
methodological approaches. 
 First, using a definition of “debt distress”, set out in detail in the following 
section, we calculate the value of debt distress for each of the rural labour households 
                                                 
1 See Panagariya (2008, p. 11). 
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(RLH) in the NSS. Then we aggregate these households to rank states, districts, and 
social groups according to the degree of their distress.  Second, using the tools of 
inequality analysis, we compute the degree of inequality in the distribution of distress 
among indebted RLH and ask how much of this inequality can be explained by the 
fact households (a) live in different states and (b) belong to different social groups?  
Third, using the tools of regression analysis, we examine the strength of the factors 
impinging on whether a household is a debtor household and, if it is, the strength of 
the factors determining whether it obtained loans from institutional sources or from 
money lenders and whether it took a loan for “productive” or “non-productive” 
purposes.   
2.  Households’ Debt Distress Ratio 
 We define the “debt distress ratio” (DDR) of a household as its total 
outstanding debt (including interest) expressed as a proportion of its monthly 
consumer expenditure: thus a DDR of 2 for a household means that its total 
outstanding debt is twice its monthly consumer expenditure.  Table 1 show that the 
DDR of RLH was highest in the state of Kerala (4.1), followed by Andhra Pradesh 
(3.0) and Haryana (2.5) and lowest in Jharkhand (0.3), Jammu and Kashmir (0.2), and 
Assam (0.2).2  The relation between the DDR in a state and the proportion of RLH in 
the state who were in debt was far from perfect: both high and low DDR states 
reported a large proportion of debtor households – 70% of households in Kerala 
(DDR= 4.1) and 62% of households in West Bengal (DDR= 0.6) were debtor 
households.  For India in its entirety, half of RLH were in debt with a DDR of 1.7.   
 At an all-India level, 15% of RLH took loans from institutional sources 
(government, banks, and cooperative societies) and 19% took loans for productive 
                                                 
2 The DDR for a state was computed by summing, respectively, the total outstanding debt and the total 
expenditure of all rural households in the state and expressing the former as a proportion of the latter.  
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purposes (including purchase of land and construction of building).  However, 29% of 
loans were made by institutions and 40% of loans were for productive purposes.  This 
suggests that, per RLH, institutional loans, and loans made for productive purposes, 
were considerably larger than non-institutional loans and loans made for non- 
productive purposes: for example, the size of loans per RLH from institutional 
sources was 2.3 times that of loans from non-institutional sources and the size of 
loans, per RLH, for productive purposes was 2.8 times that of loans for non-
productive purposes. 3  
 Table 2, 3 and 4 presents the information contained in Table 1 for, 
respectively, all RLH, agricultural labour RLH, and non-agricultural labour RLH in 
the 100 Indian districts with the highest DDR.4  Table 2 shows that, considering all 
RLH, the district with the highest DDR was Karauli in Rajasthan: in Karauli, the 
DDR was 13.2, 40% of households were debtor households, and none of the 
outstanding loans were from institutional sources or for productive purposes. At the 
other extreme, the district with the 100th highest DDR was Dewas in Madhya Pradesh 
with a DDR of 2.3, in which 95% of RLH were in debt and, as with Karauli in 
Rajasthan, none of the outstanding loans were from institutional sources or for 
productive purposes. 
 It is also possible to investigate whether certain social groups are more in debt 
than others. Using NSS data, we distinguished between the following caste-religious 
groups: 
                                                 
3 (0.29/0.15)*(0.85/0.71) and (0.4/0.19)*(0.81/0.6). 
4 There are 593 districts in India with a District Commissioner (or District Collector) acting as the 
administrative head of each district.  The median and mean populations of  these 593 districts were, 
respectively, 1.47 and 1.73 million persons: the most and the least populous districts were Medinipur in 
West Bengal (population: 9,638,473) and Yanam in Pondicherry (population: 31,362). 
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1. Adivasis5 
2. Dalits6. 
3. Non-Muslims from the Other Backward Classes (OBC).7 
4.  Muslims from the OBC. 
5.  Muslims not from the OBC. 
6. Forward Caste Hindus (hereafter, simply “Hindus”).8 
 Table 5, 6 and 7 presents the information contained in Table 1 for, 
respectively, all RLH, agricultural labour RLH, and non-agricultural labour RLH 
belonging to the six social groups above. Tables 6 and 7 show that, across all these 
groups, the proportion of debtor households was slightly greater for agricultural 
labour households (56%) than for non-agricultural labour households (54%). Table 5 
shows that, considering all RLH, the largest proportion of debtor households were 
Hindu (59% of all RLH) and the smallest proportion of debtor households were 
Adivasi (39% of all RLH).  However, the DDR was highest for Muslims from the 
OBC community (7.2 for all RLH) and lowest for non-OBC Muslims and Adivasis 
(0.8 and 0.9, respectively). 
 
 
                                                 
5 There are about 85 million Indians classified as belonging to the “Scheduled Tribes”; of these, 
Adivasis (meaning original inhabitants”) refer to the 70 million who live in the heart of India, in a 
relatively contiguous hill and forest belt extending across the states of Gujarat, Rajasthan, Maharashtra, 
Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgargh, Jharkhand, Andhra Pradesh, Orissa, Bihar, and West Bengal (Guha, 
2007). 
6 Dalits, who number about 18 million, refer to those who belong India’s “Scheduled Castes” and may 
be broadly identified with the “untouchable” castes i.e. those with whom physical contact – most 
usually taken to be the acceptance of food or water – is regarded by upper-caste Hindus as  ritually 
polluting or unclean. 
7 These are persons who, while not belonging to the Scheduled Tribes or Scheduled Castes, 
nevertheless belong to economic and socially backward groups. 
8 Forward caste Hindus were Hindus who were not included in the OBC/Dalit/ST categories. However, 
since the designation of groups in the OBC category is a state responsibility a particular (caste) group 
may be included in the OBC category in one state (i.e. be excluded from  forward caste Hindus) but be 
excluded from the OBC category in another state (i.e. be included in  forward caste Hindus). 
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3.  Inequality Analysis 
 We first computed the Gini coefficient associated with the distribution of the 
DDR, across all the 8,504 debtor households in the sample.9  This value was 0.69.  
Next, we computed the Gini coefficient associated with the distribution of the DDR 
across all the districts, with each district being assigned as many DDR values as the 
number of households.10 This value was 0.48. Lastly, we computed the Gini 
coefficient for the distribution of the DDR across the states with each state being 
assigned as many DDR values as the number of households within the state.  The 
value of the Gini coefficient falls as the unit of computation moves from the 
household (0.69), to the district (0.48), to the state (0.36).  
 Remembering that the Gini coefficient is computed as half the mean of the 
difference in the DDR between pairs of households/districts/states, divided by the 
mean DDR for the relevant unit – these results imply that: (i) the difference in the 
DDR between two households chosen at random will be 138% of the average score: 
since the mean DDR of debtor households was 3.7, this difference will be 5.1; (ii) the 
difference in the DDR between two districts chosen at random will be 96% of the 
average score: since the mean DDR of districts was 1.69, this difference will be 1.66;  
(iii) the difference in the DDR between two states chosen at random will be 72% of 
the average score: since the mean DDR of districts was 1.75, this difference will be 
1.26. 
 Armed with a knowledge of the household DDRs, one can compute how much 
of the overall inequality in their distribution can be explained by a particular factor.  
For example, how much of the inequality in the 8,504 DDR values can be accounted 
                                                 
9 That is, households for which the NSS recorded a positive outstanding debt. 
10 This means that if the average DDR for a district with N households was X, the value of the 
inequality indices was computed with N values of X for this district. Districts with a DDR of zero (that 
is, in which there were no debtor households) were not included in the calculations. 
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for by the fact that different households live in different states or that households 
belong to different social groups. We answered this question using the method of 
inequality decomposition.  
 Suppose that the sample of N=8,504 households is divided into M mutually 
exclusive and collectively exhaustive groups with Nm (m=1…M) persons in each 
group.  Let { }ip=p  and { }ip=mp  represent the vector of DDR values of, 
respectively,  all the households in sample (i=1…N) and the households in group m.  
Then an inequality index ( ; )I Np  defined over this vector is said to be additively 
decomposable if: 
 
1
( ; ) ( ; )
M
m m
m
I N I N w
=
= + = +∑ mp p B A B                             
where: ( ; )I Np  represents the overall level of inequality;  ( ; )mI Nmp  represents the 
level of inequality within group m; A – expressed as the weighted sum of the 
inequality in each group, wm being the weights – and B represent, respectively, the 
within-group and the between-group contribution to overall inequality.  
 If, indeed, inequality can be ‘additively decomposed’ along the lines of the 
above equation, then, as Cowell and Jenkins (1995) have shown, the proportionate 
contribution of the between-group component (B) to overall inequality is the income 
inequality literature’s analogue of the R2 statistic used in regression analysis: the size 
of this contribution is a measure of the amount of inequality that can be ‘explained’ 
by the factor (or factors) used to subdivide the sample (household’s state of residence; 
social group of household)      
 Only inequality indices which belong to the family of Generalised Entropy 
Indices are additively decomposable (Shorrocks, 1980).  These indices are defined by 
a parameter θ and, when θ=0, the weights are the population shares of the different 
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groups (that is, /j jw N N= );  since the weights sum to unity, the within-group 
contribution A of equation (4) is a weighted average of the inequality levels within the 
groups.  When θ=0, the inequality index takes the form:  
 
1
( ; ) log( / ) /
N
i
i
I N p p N
=
 
=  
 
∑p   
where: 
1
/
N
i
i
p p N
=
=∑  is the mean value of the DDF over the entire sample.  The 
inequality index defined above is known as the Theil’s (1967) Mean Logarithmic 
Deviation (MLD) and, because of its attractive features in terms of the interpretation 
of the weights, it  was the one used in this study  to decompose inequality in the 
household DDR values.  Our calculations showed that when the sample was 
subdivided according to the state in which the household resided, 24% of overall 
inequality could be explained by between state differences; on the other hand, when 
the sample was subdivided according to the social group of the household, 11% of 
overall inequality could be explained by between social group differences. 
4. Regression Analysis 
 An important question in analysing the indebtedness of rural 
households was to examine the influence of household characteristics and 
circumstances on: (i) the probability of a household being a debtor household; (ii) the 
probability of a debtor household taking a loan from an “institutional” source11 rather 
than from a non-instituional source; (iii) the probability of a debtor household taking a 
loan for a “productive” purpose12 rather than for a “non-productive” purpose.  
  In order to answer this question we estimated a logit model in which the 
dependent variable, Yh=1 if household h had the characteristic in question (was a 
                                                 
11Government, cooperative society; bank.  
12 Purchase of land, construction of building, or other productive purpose. 
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debtor household; took a loan from an institutional source; took a loan for a 
productive purpose), Yh=0 if it did not.The logit equation is 
1
Pr( 1) exp{ } exp{ }
1 Pr( 1)
K
h
jk j j
kh
Y X z
Y
β
=
=
= =
− = ∑  for M coefficients, βj and for observations 
on K variables. The coefficients reported in the columns of Table 8 are exp( )kβ : for a 
unit change in the value of the kth variable (xk to xk+1), the values of the other 
variables unchanged, the odds  Pr( 1)
1 Pr( 1)
h
h
Y
Y
=
− =
 are expected to change by exp( )kβ . 
Following a unit increase in the value of a variable, a coefficient estimate equal to 1 
implies that the odds ratio remains unchanged while a coefficient estimate greater 
(less) than 1 implies that the odds ratio rises (falls).   
Table 5 shows that the odds of a household being a debtor household or, if a 
debtor household, taking a loan from an institutional source or for a productive 
purpose, were unchanged as its monthly expenditure, or the area of land cultivated by 
it, increased. However, the odds of being a debtor household or, if a debtor household, 
taking a loan from an institutional source or for a productive purpose were twice as 
high for households in “forward” states compared to households in “backward” 
states.13  
Compared to forward caste Hindus (the residual social group), the odds of 
being a debtor household were 25% higher for Dalit and (non-Muslim) OBC 
households and 66% higher for (non-OBC) Muslims. For debtor households, the odds 
of obtaining a loan from institutional sources, and for using the loan for productive 
purposes, were higher for well-educated households compared to poorly educated 
households: compared to households in which everyone one was illiterate, the 
                                                 
13 Forward states were: Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Kerala, Maharshtra, Punjab, 
Tamil Nadu, and West Bengal. Backward states were: Assam, Bihar, Chattisgargh, Himachal, Jammu 
& Kashmir, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Jharkhand, and Uttaranchal. 
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probability of obtaining a loan for productive purposes rose steadily as the maximum 
education level of household numbers increased culminating in households in which 
there was at least one graduate 
4. Marriage, Health, and Education   
 The NSS reported on the purpose for which households took loans: on 
average, as Figure 1 shows, approximately one-third (34%) of loans were for the 
purposes of marriage, education, and health (MEH loans).  However, the proportion 
of MEH loans to total loans varied by social group: it was highest for Dalits (40%) 
and lowest for Muslims from the OBC (19%). The proportion of loans taken for 
productive purposes was highest for Muslims from the OBC (74%) and lowest for 
Hindus (24%). 
 Figure 2 shows the breakdown of MEH loans by the separate categories: 
marriage, education, and health.  In aggregate, 64% of loans taken for these three 
puposes were for marriages, 31% was for health, and only 4% was for education. 
However, even here there were large variations by social group: Muslims from the 
OBC and Adivasis took MEH loans largely for purposes of marriage (77% and 72%, 
respectively) while, for Hindus, 53% of MEH loans were for health. 
 Figure 3 shows the proportion of MEH loans in total loans by forward and 
backward states. MEH loans comprised 31% of total loans in forward states but 43% 
of loans in backward states; by contrast, 44% of loans taken in forward states, but 
only 25% of loans in backward states, were for productive purposes.  
 Table 9 shows the regression estimates from four equations whose dependent 
variables – the amounts of loans outstanding for, respectively, marriage, medical, 
educational, and all purposes – are determined by a number of explanatory variables.  
Compared to households in backward states, households in forward states, on average, 
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borrowed more for all three purposes; compared to non-agricultural labourers, 
agricultural labourers borrowed less for marriage; compared to forward caste Hindu 
households, Adivasi, Dalits, OBC (muslim and non-muslim) households borrowed 
significantly more for marriage but significantly less for medical purposes.14  There 
was no significant difference between the social groups for borrowing for education. 
Compared to households in which everyone was illiterate, loans taken for marriage 
and medical purposes were significantly lower for households in which the highest 
level of education was a graduate or above. 
 5. Conclusions 
 Most studies of rural indetedness in India have focused on farmers’ suicides. 
However, as this paper has pointed out, in the context of rural labour households, the 
issue of rural indetedness is far more pervasive and pernicious than suggested by the 
sad death of farmers. The contribution of this study was to build, from household 
data, a profile of district-level indetedness and a profile of social group indetedness 
using the concept of “debt distress ratio”. The limitation of this study was that- 
because of the exigencies of NSS data - it was restricted to rural labouring households 
(even though they might have owned land) and excluded non-labouring households. 
Notwithstanding this limitation, the study has drawn attention to different nature of 
loans (productive versus unproductive), their varying sources, and, in particular, loans 
taken for marriage, health, and education. 
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Table1: Debt Distress Ratios for Rural Households in Major Indian States  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
State 
Rank of 
States 
by 
Distress 
Ratio 
Rank of 
States by 
Total 
Hhd Exp. 
Distress 
Ratio 
Prop. of 
Indebted 
Hhd 
Prop. of Hhd 
taking loans 
from 
Institutional 
sources 
Prop. of  
loans taken 
from 
Institutional 
sources 
Prop. of Hhd 
taking loans 
for 
Productive 
Purposes 
Prop. of  
loans taken 
for 
Productive 
Purposes 
Kerala 1 5 4.1 70 43 48 30 61 
Andhra Pradesh 2 1 3.0 69 11 15 24 40 
Haryana 3 15 2.5 62 15 26 20 26 
Tamil Nadu 4 6 2.4 49 12 21 16 35 
Punjab 5 12 1.8 52 10 19 14 21 
Rajasthan 6 11 1.8 40 9 6 9 11 
Uttar Pradesh 7 3 1.5 47 13 29 19 31 
Maharashtra 8 2 1.5 44 27 52 25 52 
Karnataka 9 7 1.1 32 19 36 23 39 
Madhya Pradesh 10 10 1.1 40 10 19 11 17 
Chhattisgarh 11 14 1.0 51 15 30 25 46 
Gujarat 12 8 1.0 53 5 15 11 25 
Himachal Pradesh 13 18 0.9 36 21 35 13 21 
Uttaranchal 14 19 0.8 28 15 23 19 28 
Orissa 15 13 0.6 32 17 35 22 36 
West Bengal 16 4 0.6 62 6 15 16 32 
Bihar 17 9 0.6 38 4 10 7 19 
Jharkhand 18 17 0.3 21 6 11 10 22 
Jammu & Kashmir 19 20 0.3 44 0 0 1 3 
Assam 20 16 0.2 60 0 0 1 1 
All India   1.7 50 15 29 19 40 
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Table 2: Loan Information for the 100 Districts with the Highest Debt Distress Ratios: all Rural Labour Households 
State 
Top 100 
Distresses District 
Rank of 
Districts 
by 
Distress 
Ratio 
Rank of 
Districts by 
Total 
Household 
Expenditure 
Distress 
Ratio 
Prop. of 
Indebted 
Households 
Prop. Of 
households 
taking loans 
from 
Institutional 
sources 
Prop. of  
loans taken 
from 
Institutional 
sources 
Prop. of 
households 
taking 
loans for 
Productive 
Purposes 
Prop. of  
loans 
taken for 
Productive 
Purposes 
Rajasthan Karauli 1 457 13.2 40 0 0 0 0 
Uttar Pradesh Mathura 2 323 9.6 48 47 16 43 84 
Kerala 
Thiruvanantha-
puram 3 2 8.1 85 25 13 33 84 
Uttar Pradesh Hamirpur 4 421 8.0 47 35 85 35 85 
Haryana Mahendragarh 5 395 7.2 48 57 22 0 0 
Haryana Bhiwani 6 393 6.8 82 17 16 10 21 
Kerala Kottayam 7 3 6.0 92 47 54 32 57 
Kerala Pathanamthitta 8 128 5.8 76 42 81 32 79 
Tamil Nadu Kanniyakumari 9 239 5.8 55 27 40 57 81 
Haryana Panchkula 10 392 5.4 23 33 20 33 20 
Tamil Nadu Vellore 11 73 5.3 45 10 7 36 80 
Tamil Nadu Perambalur 12 397 5.2 77 2 1 0 0 
Rajasthan Rajsamand 13 319 5.2 95 20 6 0 0 
Andhra Pradesh Kurnool 14 36 5.1 84 26 35 36 46 
Haryana Kaithal 15 368 4.7 64 0 0 0 0 
Andhra Pradesh Cuddapah 16 109 4.7 61 0 0 29 51 
Andhra Pradesh Mahbubnagar 17 17 4.7 84 18 20 60 77 
Andhra Pradesh Karimnagar 18 44 4.4 51 10 14 44 55 
Tamil Nadu The Nilgiris 19 242 4.4 49 24 4 14 83 
Karnataka Mandya 20 165 4.4 78 7 5 14 31 
Tamil Nadu Virudhunagar 21 92 4.4 60 31 56 8 7 
  2 
Haryana Jind 22 222 4.4 76 24 25 31 29 
Kerala Kannur 23 155 4.3 36 91 95 72 79 
Madhya Pradesh Sheopur 24 501 4.2 83 0 0 0 0 
Tamil Nadu Dharmapuri 25 89 4.1 60 19 28 17 16 
Tamil Nadu Viluppuram 26 63 4.0 65 12 31 14 31 
Andhra Pradesh Anantapur 27 72 4.0 86 13 19 30 43 
Andhra Pradesh Nalgonda 28 23 3.9 62 3 1 20 18 
Maharashtra Solapur 29 33 3.9 58 31 70 28 56 
Andhra Pradesh Medak 30 47 3.9 63 11 13 30 30 
Tamil Nadu Ramanathapuram 31 201 3.8 76 15 8 33 37 
Tamil Nadu Cuddalore 32 122 3.7 63 1 1 1 2 
Uttar Pradesh Bulandshahr 33 97 3.6 77 11 8 29 41 
Madhya Pradesh Ratlam 34 286 3.6 35 16 11 31 31 
Pondicherry Pondicherry 35 293 3.5 46 3 2 30 54 
Tamil Nadu Tirunelveli 36 123 3.5 52 21 20 17 41 
Andhra Pradesh West Godavari 37 15 3.4 61 3 4 17 21 
Kerala Ernakulam 38 5 3.4 74 48 61 23 35 
Punjab Fatehgarh Sahib 39 278 3.4 85 3 6 10 12 
Uttar Pradesh Aligarh 40 160 3.4 59 28 22 30 37 
Andhra Pradesh Srikakulam 41 43 3.4 57 15 14 23 42 
Gujarat Dohad 42 164 3.3 59 16 12 36 39 
Punjab Kapurthala 43 402 3.3 56 0 0 0 0 
Punjab Patiala 44 134 3.3 54 17 13 16 16 
Rajasthan Nagaur 45 216 3.3 47 0 0 14 41 
Rajasthan Jhunjhunun 46 147 3.3 79 10 8 0 0 
Punjab Mansa 47 411 3.3 38 6 6 6 6 
Punjab Bathinda 48 265 3.2 71 4 1 18 35 
  3 
Rajasthan Bhilwara 49 317 3.1 38 20 18 22 19 
Tamil Nadu Sivaganga 50 237 3.0 85 22 17 16 15 
Karnataka Mysore 51 114 3.0 55 9 22 9 33 
Andhra Pradesh Visakhapatnam 52 35 3.0 67 12 14 18 37 
Kerala Kollam 53 11 3.0 77 38 65 24 39 
Uttar Pradesh Allahabad 54 40 2.9 62 19 49 3 3 
Madhya Pradesh Ujjain 55 196 2.9 99 4 6 10 13 
Andhra Pradesh East Godavari 56 1 2.8 91 6 13 18 41 
Madhya Pradesh Rajgarh 57 145 2.8 96 11 11 11 11 
Uttar Pradesh Azamgarh 58 235 2.8 70 3 9 3 6 
Rajasthan Dausa 59 367 2.8 60 5 4 38 62 
Andhra Pradesh Chittoor 60 70 2.8 58 31 27 27 38 
Haryana Kurukshetra 61 332 2.8 71 13 61 12 8 
Kerala Thrissur 62 10 2.7 77 34 75 17 46 
Rajasthan Ganganagar 63 139 2.7 43 0 0 0 0 
Uttar Pradesh Kushinagar 64 180 2.7 55 25 36 25 8 
Andhra Pradesh Vizianagaram 65 93 2.7 58 17 36 23 38 
Tamil Nadu Thanjavur 66 31 2.6 81 5 7 14 22 
Andhra Pradesh Prakasam 67 30 2.6 77 7 10 12 31 
Punjab Sangrur 68 45 2.6 71 8 42 8 11 
Haryana Rewari 69 467 2.6 44 15 17 5 17 
Punjab Nawanshahr 70 329 2.6 90 33 30 29 36 
Orissa Ganjam 71 214 2.6 65 4 27 4 17 
Karnataka Hassan 72 174 2.5 38 24 45 32 52 
Kerala Malappuram 73 22 2.5 45 58 76 48 44 
Madhya Pradesh Morena 74 398 2.5 63 9 27 0 0 
Kerala Alappuzha 75 27 2.5 62 43 62 36 42 
  4 
Rajasthan Churu 76 168 2.5 44 0 0 0 0 
Goa North Goa 77 424 2.4 36 60 90 60 90 
Uttar Pradesh Agra 78 331 2.4 48 3 26 7 6 
Andhra Pradesh Warangal 79 38 2.4 74 7 12 20 37 
Haryana Rohtak 80 492 2.4 15 0 0 0 0 
Tamil Nadu Salem 81 56 2.3 25 19 30 21 40 
Maharashtra Osmanabad 82 171 2.3 48 42 44 55 69 
Kerala Wayanad 83 218 2.3 58 49 67 46 75 
Andhra Pradesh Krishna 84 7 2.3 65 11 13 24 35 
Andhra Pradesh Rangareddi 85 130 2.3 70 29 45 36 50 
Uttar Pradesh Ghaziabad 86 268 2.3 60 43 63 10 12 
Tamil Nadu Pudukkottai 87 113 2.2 45 3 1 24 65 
Haryana Panipat 88 443 2.2 49 22 44 22 22 
Maharashtra Sangli 89 108 2.2 17 26 89 37 90 
Rajasthan Bundi 90 494 2.2 9 0 0 0 0 
Maharashtra Gondiya 91 343 2.2 20 77 99 77 99 
Uttar Pradesh Muzaffarnagar 92 87 2.2 63 13 11 22 24 
Maharashtra Jalgaon 93 49 2.2 42 36 51 21 19 
Kerala Palakkad 94 26 2.2 57 62 78 22 34 
Jharkhand Lohardaga 95 509 2.1 34 0 0 0 0 
Kerala Kozhikode 96 34 2.1 40 56 73 37 47 
Uttar Pradesh Etah 97 229 2.1 65 12 30 23 33 
Haryana Hisar 98 224 2.1 42 44 41 31 28 
Madhya Pradesh Dewas 99 118 2.1 81 14 19 6 13 
Kerala Idukki 100 19 2.1 90 38 43 29 58 
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Table 3: Loan Information for the 100 Districts with the Highest Debt Distress Ratios: Agricultural Labour Rural Households 
State 
Top 100 Distresses 
District 
Rank of 
Districts by 
Distress 
Ratio 
Rank of 
Districts by 
Total 
Household 
Expenditure 
Distress 
Ratio 
Prop. of 
Indebted 
Households 
Prop. Of 
households 
taking loans 
from 
Institutional 
sources 
Prop. of  loans 
taken from 
Institutional 
sources 
Prop. of 
households 
taking loans 
for 
Productive 
Purposes 
Prop. of  
loans taken 
for 
Productive 
Purposes 
Uttar Pradesh Mathura 1 359 22.4 53 0 0 35 92 
Uttar Pradesh Jalaun 2 499 15.0 100 100 100 100 100 
Haryana Bhiwani 3 472 12.3 100 0 0 100 100 
Haryana Gurgaon 4 454 12.2 100 50 36 50 36 
Punjab Kapurthala 5 432 11.2 47 0 0 0 0 
Haryana Panchkula 6 371 11.0 40 24 17 24 17 
Tamil Nadu Virudhunagar 7 232 9.1 52 33 70 0 0 
Haryana Rohtak 8 465 8.8 58 0 0 0 0 
Haryana Rewari 9 497 8.6 48 0 0 100 100 
Kerala Kannur 10 304 8.0 50 82 90 84 90 
Haryana Kaithal 11 337 7.5 73 0 0 0 0 
Andhra Pradesh Cuddapah 12 146 7.2 80 0 0 25 43 
Andhra Pradesh Kurnool 13 25 6.2 89 28 37 40 50 
Madhya Pradesh Morena 14 421 5.5 53 0 0 0 0 
Maharashtra Solapur 15 21 5.5 75 33 72 30 57 
Tamil Nadu Perambalur 16 279 5.4 80 0 0 0 0 
Uttar Pradesh Deoria 17 357 5.4 76 19 46 0 0 
Rajasthan Karauli 18 415 5.3 31 0 0 0 0 
Tamil Nadu The Nilgiris 19 171 5.3 58 24 4 15 84 
Uttar Pradesh Azamgarh 20 286 5.3 72 0 0 0 0 
Andhra Pradesh Karimnagar 21 38 5.2 53 12 17 61 69 
Karnataka Mandya 22 109 5.2 85 7 5 14 31 
Tamil Nadu Cuddalore 23 111 4.9 77 0 0 0 0 
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Uttar Pradesh Meerut 24 336 4.9 61 0 0 42 17 
Andhra Pradesh Mahbubnagar 25 10 4.9 86 19 25 59 75 
Tamil Nadu Dharmapuri 26 87 4.8 70 20 34 12 3 
Rajasthan Bundi 27 446 4.8 17 0 0 0 0 
Uttar Pradesh Agra 28 395 4.8 30 25 54 0 0 
Madhya Pradesh Ratlam 29 292 4.6 51 19 18 27 21 
Punjab Patiala 30 231 4.6 71 6 1 6 1 
Punjab Mansa 31 347 4.5 37 0 0 0 0 
Uttar Pradesh Bulandshahr 32 113 4.5 97 17 11 29 51 
Tamil Nadu Salem 33 166 4.5 32 34 41 36 54 
Andhra Pradesh Anantapur 34 53 4.5 94 14 20 30 40 
Pondicherry Pondicherry 35 330 4.5 70 4 3 28 40 
Tamil Nadu Viluppuram 36 54 4.4 69 9 25 13 26 
Tamil Nadu Kanniyakumari 37 343 4.4 50 29 35 28 49 
Madhya Pradesh Sheopur 38 436 4.2 81 0 0 0 0 
Tamil Nadu Ramanathapuram 39 225 4.2 97 22 14 42 45 
Andhra Pradesh Nalgonda 40 18 4.2 60 2 1 15 10 
Maharashtra Osmanabad 41 228 4.1 66 52 46 62 75 
Andhra Pradesh Medak 42 24 4.0 63 9 13 30 23 
Punjab Nawanshahr 43 381 3.9 81 30 17 28 41 
Andhra Pradesh Visakhapatnam 44 61 3.8 84 13 20 16 37 
Rajasthan Ganganagar 45 132 3.8 51 0 0 0 0 
Tamil Nadu Sivaganga 46 234 3.8 90 14 13 24 19 
Andhra Pradesh West Godavari 47 7 3.8 67 4 5 17 19 
Rajasthan Churu 48 313 3.8 79 0 0 0 0 
Kerala Ernakulam 49 154 3.7 97 49 88 29 53 
Kerala Kozhikode 50 101 3.7 63 63 87 39 45 
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Haryana Ambala 51 394 3.7 85 37 65 43 76 
Punjab Bathinda 52 181 3.7 80 4 1 18 35 
Haryana Jind 53 303 3.7 80 9 8 43 39 
Andhra Pradesh Srikakulam 54 34 3.6 64 15 18 22 45 
Rajasthan Jaipur 55 448 3.5 53 0 0 0 0 
Tamil Nadu Tirunelveli 56 167 3.5 59 24 32 11 41 
Karnataka Mysore 57 83 3.5 65 8 23 8 29 
Kerala Thiruvanantha-puram 58 78 3.5 89 33 61 38 56 
Punjab Ludhiana 59 283 3.5 75 10 19 11 4 
Maharashtra Sangli 60 99 3.2 21 31 89 43 90 
Gujarat Dohad 61 247 3.1 67 26 28 30 36 
Andhra Pradesh Chittoor 62 60 3.1 66 34 36 23 26 
Haryana Sonipat 63 244 3.1 93 12 9 7 1 
Madhya Pradesh Jabalpur 64 329 3.1 21 0 0 0 0 
Kerala Thrissur 65 28 3.1 89 30 72 19 50 
Karnataka Dakshina Kannada 66 269 3.1 72 37 47 31 75 
Andhra Pradesh East Godavari 67 1 3.0 95 6 11 20 44 
Uttar Pradesh Muzaffarnagar 68 266 3.0 62 0 0 0 0 
Uttar Pradesh Kushinagar 69 170 3.0 58 30 42 29 3 
Andhra Pradesh Rangareddi 70 195 2.9 79 42 63 52 70 
Uttaranchal Dehradun 71 460 2.9 61 0 0 0 0 
Punjab Fatehgarh Sahib 72 441 2.9 77 30 74 46 83 
Madhya Pradesh Rajgarh 73 67 2.8 98 11 11 11 11 
Gujarat Rajkot 74 267 2.8 52 24 26 41 49 
Andhra Pradesh Krishna 75 3 2.8 72 12 13 24 36 
Madhya Pradesh Ujjain 76 116 2.8 100 5 7 6 7 
Tamil Nadu Vellore 77 183 2.8 44 11 7 38 61 
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Uttar Pradesh Mainpuri 78 385 2.8 86 0 0 0 0 
Tamil Nadu Pudukkottai 79 88 2.8 49 4 1 29 71 
Andhra Pradesh Warangal 80 26 2.8 84 8 12 19 39 
Kerala Kollam 81 144 2.8 77 47 73 28 37 
Rajasthan Jodhpur 82 405 2.7 31 0 0 0 0 
Kerala Wayanad 83 215 2.7 52 50 62 52 76 
Andhra Pradesh Prakasam 84 22 2.7 82 8 14 11 20 
Maharashtra Jalgaon 85 45 2.7 50 38 51 22 18 
Uttar Pradesh Saharanpur 86 123 2.7 71 23 23 30 46 
Uttaranchal Hardwar 87 284 2.6 36 30 30 46 38 
Gujarat Surendranagar 88 124 2.6 100 2 1 8 3 
Punjab Gurdaspur 89 327 2.6 95 0 0 20 29 
Kerala Kottayam 90 42 2.5 94 46 76 28 41 
Karnataka Hassan 91 97 2.5 37 23 44 31 51 
Kerala Palakkad 92 36 2.5 73 61 70 19 25 
Punjab Sangrur 93 50 2.5 80 5 15 4 6 
Maharashtra Satara 94 47 2.4 99 27 17 9 24 
Karnataka Chikmagalur 95 209 2.4 37 29 30 67 78 
Tamil Nadu Thanjavur 96 39 2.4 70 3 1 11 7 
Andhra Pradesh Vizianagaram 97 79 2.4 66 16 19 17 17 
Maharashtra Pune 98 51 2.3 97 32 57 14 31 
Madhya Pradesh Dewas 99 68 2.3 89 14 19 6 13 
Rajasthan Kota 100 443 2.3 55 0 0 0 0 
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Table 4: Loan Information for the 100 Districts with the Highest Debt Distress Ratios: Non-Agricultural Labour Rural Households 
State 
Top 100 Distresses 
District 
Rank of 
Districts by 
Distress 
Ratio 
Rank of 
Districts by 
Total 
Household 
Expenditure 
Distress 
Ratio 
Prop. of 
Indebted 
Households 
Prop. Of 
households 
taking loans 
from 
Institutional 
sources 
Prop. of  loans 
taken from 
Institutional 
sources 
Prop. of 
households 
taking loans 
for 
Productive 
Purposes 
Prop. of  
loans taken 
for 
Productive 
Purposes 
Rajasthan Karauli 1 408 36.5 74 0 0 0 0 
Kerala Pathanamthitta 2 121 13.1 75 59 97 38 94 
Madhya Pradesh Ratlam 3 394 11.3 48 0 0 49 49 
Madhya Pradesh Vidisha 4 393 10.8 75 0 0 0 0 
Kerala Thiruvanantha-puram 5 1 9.6 92 23 10 32 86 
Uttar Pradesh Hamirpur 6 181 9.0 53 35 85 35 85 
Haryana Mahendragarh 7 156 8.2 55 57 22 0 0 
Tamil Nadu Kanniyakumari 8 111 7.8 71 26 41 69 90 
Tamil Nadu Vellore 9 23 7.4 53 10 7 34 84 
Kerala Kottayam 10 2 7.3 95 47 52 34 59 
Pondicherry Pondicherry 11 282 7.0 66 0 0 33 70 
Haryana Bhiwani 12 155 6.7 86 18 19 5 7 
Tamil Nadu Thanjavur 13 50 5.7 80 18 41 9 40 
Madhya Pradesh Sheopur 14 460 5.6 100 0 0 0 0 
Andhra Pradesh Srikakulam 15 135 5.4 83 15 5 27 32 
Haryana Jind 16 98 5.4 81 35 32 23 25 
Madhya Pradesh Ujjain 17 395 5.3 100 0 0 43 49 
Rajasthan Rajsamand 18 82 5.2 96 20 6 0 0 
Maharashtra Gondiya 19 225 5.0 28 100 100 100 100 
Bihar Buxar 20 462 4.9 51 0 0 0 0 
Tamil Nadu Perambalur 21 517 4.9 71 100 100 0 0 
Karnataka Mysore 22 382 4.9 22 26 12 49 73 
Uttar Pradesh Aligarh 23 64 4.8 80 36 26 38 43 
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Andhra Pradesh Medak 24 159 4.7 77 22 12 30 62 
Andhra Pradesh Mahbubnagar 25 61 4.7 90 10 3 61 86 
Tamil Nadu Tirunelveli 26 103 4.6 58 16 7 29 41 
Karnataka Hassan 27 451 4.5 75 50 64 50 64 
Goa North Goa 28 253 4.4 66 60 90 60 90 
Andhra Pradesh West Godavari 29 145 4.4 79 0 0 17 32 
Kerala Kannur 30 84 4.4 39 100 100 61 67 
Gujarat Dohad 31 94 4.3 65 5 1 42 41 
Andhra Pradesh Vizianagaram 32 147 4.3 48 21 66 52 78 
Kerala Ernakulam 33 3 4.3 91 48 58 21 32 
Uttar Pradesh Mathura 34 205 4.3 69 78 79 48 51 
Haryana Kurukshetra 35 199 4.1 69 17 78 0 0 
Andhra Pradesh Kurnool 36 67 4.1 96 18 25 25 30 
Andhra Pradesh Anantapur 37 188 4.0 82 4 14 34 58 
Andhra Pradesh Cuddapah 38 176 4.0 51 1 0 47 90 
Orissa Nayagarh 39 351 3.9 40 8 14 0 0 
Gujarat Amreli 40 272 3.9 69 64 89 64 89 
Tamil Nadu Ramanathapuram 41 133 3.8 66 0 0 16 25 
Andhra Pradesh Nalgonda 42 29 3.8 75 3 2 32 39 
Rajasthan Jhunjhunun 43 31 3.8 77 9 5 0 0 
Andhra Pradesh Khammam 44 139 3.7 80 4 3 8 8 
Rajasthan Nagaur 45 60 3.7 47 0 0 17 43 
Punjab Fatehgarh Sahib 46 79 3.6 91 0 0 6 6 
Maharashtra Kolhapur 47 65 3.6 82 24 35 24 39 
Orissa Ganjam 48 89 3.6 70 7 32 5 17 
Uttar Pradesh Auraiya 49 411 3.5 32 0 0 0 0 
Haryana Panipat 50 327 3.5 53 10 34 0 0 
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Uttar Pradesh Allahabad 51 6 3.4 72 19 48 1 1 
Kerala Kollam 52 4 3.4 86 36 64 23 40 
Rajasthan Bhilwara 53 90 3.4 41 20 18 22 19 
Tamil Nadu Viluppuram 54 75 3.4 54 27 48 18 46 
Maharashtra Dhule 55 157 3.3 50 52 85 46 76 
Kerala Alappuzha 56 10 3.3 77 44 64 37 44 
Punjab Sangrur 57 46 3.3 67 17 78 19 17 
Tamil Nadu Thiruvarur 58 102 3.2 96 5 4 28 38 
Andhra Pradesh Chittoor 59 126 3.1 51 13 1 47 74 
Uttar Pradesh Agra 60 224 3.1 95 0 0 8 12 
Andhra Pradesh Visakhapatnam 61 19 3.1 62 9 7 22 38 
Haryana Hisar 62 142 3.1 54 53 49 44 37 
Andhra Pradesh Prakasam 63 39 3.1 77 3 4 16 51 
Rajasthan Dausa 64 127 3.1 67 5 4 38 62 
Tamil Nadu Dharmapuri 65 91 3.0 45 15 11 33 57 
Kerala Thrissur 66 7 3.0 83 38 78 16 43 
Uttar Pradesh Etah 67 178 3.0 73 0 0 0 0 
Andhra Pradesh Karimnagar 68 48 2.9 47 3 5 4 6 
Kerala Malappuram 69 5 2.9 47 57 73 49 44 
Tamil Nadu Cuddalore 70 269 2.9 71 11 13 8 24 
Punjab Patiala 71 70 2.8 52 27 27 25 33 
Tamil Nadu Nagapattinam 72 57 2.8 81 16 16 20 30 
Uttar Pradesh Bulandshahr 73 85 2.8 66 0 0 30 14 
Tamil Nadu Namakkal 74 200 2.7 38 31 77 31 77 
Uttar Pradesh Varanasi 75 148 2.7 40 29 81 29 81 
Tamil Nadu Dindigul 76 108 2.7 41 25 9 31 17 
Maharashtra Pune 77 13 2.7 69 13 76 23 82 
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Kerala Kasaragod 78 95 2.6 40 75 83 32 22 
Pondicherry Karaikal 79 361 2.6 78 15 15 68 87 
Uttar Pradesh Muzaffarnagar 80 41 2.6 87 19 17 31 37 
Rajasthan Chittaurgarh 81 352 2.6 23 0 0 0 0 
Karnataka Chamarajanagar 82 296 2.6 59 34 32 38 27 
Tamil Nadu Erode 83 81 2.5 44 25 60 26 37 
Orissa Jagatsinghapur 84 323 2.5 45 0 0 32 21 
Rajasthan Tonk 85 248 2.5 49 0 0 0 0 
Tamil Nadu Virudhunagar 86 33 2.5 76 30 30 13 20 
Tamil Nadu Tiruchirappalli 87 169 2.5 46 0 0 22 50 
Andhra Pradesh East Godavari 88 11 2.4 90 9 23 4 19 
Madhya Pradesh Gwalior 89 379 2.4 97 0 0 0 0 
Maharashtra Nandurbar 90 214 2.4 66 0 0 0 0 
Tamil Nadu Sivaganga 91 202 2.4 90 34 29 3 3 
Himachal Pradesh Solan 92 280 2.4 39 39 74 13 12 
Rajasthan Alwar 93 20 2.3 68 25 15 32 25 
Kerala Palakkad 94 15 2.3 46 64 89 30 46 
Maharashtra Jalgaon 95 100 2.3 42 23 49 16 23 
Himachal Pradesh Kinnaur 96 490 2.3 81 0 0 0 0 
Haryana Rewari 97 244 2.3 44 16 21 0 0 
Uttar Pradesh Kushinagar 98 150 2.3 51 14 21 14 21 
Uttar Pradesh Ambedkar Nag. 99 223 2.3 88 30 71 0 0 
Madhya Pradesh Dewas 100 468 2.3 95 0 0 0 0 
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Table 5: Debt Distress Ratios by Social Groups, all RLH 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Debt Distress Ratios by Social Groups, Agricultural Labour RLH 
 
Social Group 
Rank of 
Social 
Group 
by 
Distress 
Ratio 
Rank of 
Social 
Group by 
Total 
Household 
Expenditure 
Distress 
Ratio 
Prop. of 
Indebted 
Households 
Prop. Of 
households 
taking loans 
from 
Institutional 
sources 
Prop. of  
loans taken 
from 
Institutional 
sources 
Prop. of 
households 
taking loans 
for 
Productive 
Purposes 
Prop. of  
loans taken 
for 
Productive 
Purposes 
Adivasi 5 4 0.9 45 10 18 16 29 
Dalits 4 2 1.4 51 12 25 15 28 
OBC (non-Muslim) 2 1 2.0 50 18 33 23 41 
OBC  (Muslim) 1 6 3.5 42 20 21 16 74 
Muslim (non-OBC) 6 5 0.8 56 7 22 12 24 
Hindu (FC) 3 3 1.9 52 17 30 23 46 
All India   1.7 50 15 29 19 40 
Social Group 
Rank of 
Social 
Group 
by 
Distress 
Ratio 
Rank of 
Social 
Group by 
Total 
Househol
d 
Expendit
ure 
Distress 
Ratio 
Prop. of 
Indebted 
Househol
ds 
Prop. Of 
households 
taking loans 
from 
Institutional 
sources 
Prop. of  
loans taken 
from 
Institutional 
sources 
Prop. of 
households 
taking loans 
for 
Productive 
Purposes 
Prop. of  
loans taken 
for 
Productive 
Purposes 
Adivasi 6 3 1.0 48 10 20 16 29 
Dalits 3 2 1.5 57 11 20 15 28 
OBC (non-Muslim) 2 1 2.1 56 16 30 23 39 
OBC  (Muslim) 4 6 1.2 48 18 44 15 29 
Muslim (non-OBC) 5 5 1.1 66 6 23 14 25 
Hindu (FC) 1 4 2.3 61 15 24 25 46 
All India   1.7 56 13 27 19 36 
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Table 7: Debt Distress Ratios by Social Groups, non-Agricultural Labour RLH 
 
Social Group 
Rank of 
Social 
Group by 
Distress 
Ratio 
Rank of 
Social 
Group by 
Total 
Household 
Expenditur
e 
Distress 
Ratio 
Prop. of 
Indebted 
Households 
Prop. Of 
households 
taking loans from 
Institutional 
sources 
Prop. of  loans 
taken from 
Institutional 
sources 
Prop. of 
households 
taking loans for 
Productive 
Purposes 
Prop. of  loans 
taken for 
Productive 
Purposes 
Adivasi 5 4 0.9 39 10 12 16 29 
Dalits 4 2 1.8 53 15 32 16 29 
OBC (non-Muslim) 2 1 2.6 56 21 37 23 43 
OBC  (Muslim) 1 5 7.2 55 23 17 18 81 
Muslim (non-OBC) 6 6 0.8 60 8 20 8 20 
Hindu (FC) 3 3 2.1 59 20 39 20 47 
All India   2.3 54 18 32 19 47 
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Table 8: Logit and Regression Equations of Household Debt 
 Debtor 
Household 
Loans from 
Insitutional 
Source 
Loans for 
Productive 
Purpose 
Total household 
monthly 
expenditure 
1.000*** 1.000 1.000 
 (6.61) (1.48) (0.75) 
Forward States 2.101*** 2.442*** 2.514*** 
 (15.10) (8.83) (10.21) 
Land cultivated 1.000*** 1.000** 1.000*** 
 (3.04) (2.22) (5.31) 
Agriculture 
Labourer 
1.371*** 1.068 1.188** 
 (6.56) (0.72) (2.03) 
Adivasis 0.992 0.742 0.927 
 (0.08) (1.61) (0.47) 
Dalits 1.253*** 1.084 1.035 
 (2.83) (0.57) (0.26) 
Other Backward 
Classes (non-
Muslim) 
1.251*** 1.205 1.108 
 (2.94) (1.42) (0.83) 
Muslim (OBC) 0.818 2.328*** 0.954 
 (1.39) (3.46) (0.18) 
Muslim (non-OBC) 1.626*** 0.271*** 0.369*** 
 (4.26) (4.46) (4.41) 
Informal Education 1.217 0.860 0.639 
 (1.28) (0.39) (1.33) 
Below Primary 1.259*** 0.870 1.018 
 (2.80) (0.71) (0.11) 
Primary and Middle 1.250*** 1.492** 1.157 
 (3.17) (2.51) (1.10) 
Seconday, Higher 
Secondary and 
Diploma 
0.983 2.243*** 1.112 
 (0.19) (4.59) (0.68) 
Graduate and Above 0.800 4.766*** 1.007 
 (1.21) (5.31) (0.02) 
Number of 
dependents in 
household 
1.121 1.418** 0.786 
 (1.23) (2.45) (1.60) 
Constant    
    
Observations 8046 3735 3735 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
Notes: 
Debtor household = 1, if household has taken loan, 0 otherwise 
Loans from Institutional Source = 1 if debtor household has taken 
loan from institutional source, 0 otherwise 
Loans for productive purpose = 1 if debtor household has taken loan 
for productive purpose, 0 otherwise 
Institutional Source: government, cooperative society; bank. 
Productive Purpose: purchase of land, construction of building, or 
other productive purpose. 
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Table 9: Regression Estimates of Marriage, Medical, and Education Loans 
 Marriage Loans Medical Loans Education Loans Amount 
Outstanding 
Total household 
loans 
0.039*** 0.013*** 0.006***  
 (35.40) (33.19) (21.73)  
Total Household 
Monthly 
Expenditure 
   2.907*** 
    (10.23) 
Forward States 47,397.090*** 19,588.552*** 4,160.299*** 4,177.694*** 
 (15.59) (17.69) (5.26) (5.53) 
Land cultivated -1.830 2.603*** -0.150 2.279*** 
 (0.80) (3.13) (0.25) (3.87) 
Agriculture 
Labourer 
-10,728.536*** 183.345 235.587 -1,449.087* 
 (3.74) (0.18) (0.32) (1.94) 
Adivasis 10,760.835* -10,411.015*** -1,798.725 -1,010.295 
 (1.93) (5.13) (1.24) (0.70) 
Dalits 18,556.970*** -4,125.131** -1,790.514 319.541 
 (3.96) (2.42) (1.47) (0.26) 
Other Backward 
Classes (non-
Muslim) 
28,034.320*** -697.721 232.420 3,127.516*** 
 (6.26) (0.43) (0.20) (2.71) 
Muslim (OBC) 110,353.980*** -14,114.476*** -3,606.421 13,848.627*** 
 (12.34) (4.33) (1.55) (5.98) 
Muslim (non-
OBC) 
-11,100.572* -8,803.643*** -2,017.899 -3,153.587* 
 (1.74) (3.79) (1.22) (1.92) 
Informal 
Education 
-7,379.223 -1,890.910 -895.327 -2,482.626 
 (0.79) (0.55) (0.37) (1.02) 
Below Primary -7,913.814 -2,903.444 -1,332.553 -1,670.831 
 (1.55) (1.56) (1.00) (1.26) 
Primary and 
Middle 
-9,988.710** -4,009.671** -276.353 -1,529.343 
 (2.32) (2.55) (0.25) (1.35) 
Seconday, 
Higher 
Secondary and 
Diploma 
4,349.535 -3,153.739* 2,834.354** 2,131.716 
 (0.84) (1.68) (2.11) (1.55) 
Graduate and 
Above 
-19,884.306* -8,818.054** 4,181.893 39.988 
 (1.82) (2.21) (1.47) (0.01) 
Number of 
dependents in 
household 
20,183.281*** -837.881 5,822.355*** 2,233.956* 
 (3.92) (0.45) (4.34) (1.68) 
Constant 7,482.868 12,964.663*** 377.134 -1,801.047 
 (1.26) (5.99) (0.24) (1.11) 
Observations 3735 3735 3735 3735 
R-squared 0.42 0.38 0.18 0.19 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%    
 
